National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act ( FINSA ) in Foreign Investment in the U.S. by Goes de Moraes Gavioli, Maira
Law Raza
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 1
2011
National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act
("FINSA") in Foreign Investment in the U.S.
Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/lawraza
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Raza by an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Goes de Moraes Gavioli, Maira (2011) "National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign Investment and National




THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL 
 
 
The William Mitchell 









CRAIG GREEN  
BHUPESH PATTNI 
YAHAIRA PINZON 
ROBERT T. TROUSDALE 
 
Faculty Advisor 










VOLUME 2 Winter 2011  ISSUE 1 
1 
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL 
 
National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act (“FINSA”) in Foreign Investment in the U.S. 
 
Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli 
I. INTRODUCTION 2 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Exon Florio Regulatory Framework 
 1.  Where It All Began: Creating the CFIUS 
 2.  The Exon-Florio Amendment To The Defense Production Act 
  a.  The Exon-Florio‟s CFIUS Process In A Nutshell 
  b.  Exon-Florio‟s National Security & Confidentiality Provisions 
  c.  The CATIC-MAMCO Transaction 
  d.  The Thomson-CSF & LTV Corporation Transaction 
  e.  The Byrd Amendment 
B.  Post 9/11 Application of Exon-Florio: Finding the Balance Between  
      National Security and Open Foreign Investment 
 1. The Dubai Ports World and P&O Steam Navigation Transaction 
C.  The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
 1. Interpreting FINSA‟s Key Terms 
  a. “National Security” 
  b. “Covered Transaction” & “Control” 



















A.  FINSA‟s Lack of Analytical Guidance for National Security Risks has the  
      Potential to turn FINSA into an Instrument for Protectionism 
B.  FINSA‟s expanded Congressional Oversight Has The Potential To Unduly 
      Politicize Foreign Investment 
C.  FINSA‟s Broad Coverage Has the Potential to Burden Foreign Investors and     
      Negatively Impact Foreign Investment 
D.  Congress Can Improve FINSA by Providing Clear Analytical Guidance to   
      Real National Security Risks, Limiting Congressional Involvement, and  












IV. CONCLUSION 40 
 
VOLUME 2 Winter 2011  ISSUE 1 
2 
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“International investment in the United States promotes 
economic growth, productivity, competitiveness, and 
job creation. It is the policy of the United States to 
support unequivocally such investment, consistent with 




Foreign investment is vital to the continued growth and vitality of the U.S. economy. 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of Economic Analysis, foreigners 
invested an impressive $260.4 billion in the U.S. in 2008, amid a slow national economy and 
despite a worldwide decrease in merger and acquisition activities.
2
 Foreign investment is a vital 
source of job creation, innovation, development and critical to the U.S. manufacturing industry.
3
 
As of 2006, foreign investors employed more than 5 million Americans and were responsible for 
roughly 20% of the U.S. manufacturing GDP.
4
 Even though foreign investment is necessary to 
the U.S. economy, some critics perceive foreign imports as a threat to the U.S. economy, 
sovereignty and national security. Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National 
                                                        
1 Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (amending Exec. Order 11,858 and stating the U.S. 
foreign investment policy). 
2 See generally, THOMAS ANDERSON, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 54 (2009), available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/06June/0609_fdius.pdf. 
3 David Marchick, Remarks Before Senator Baucus Trade and Security Forum 1 (Apr. 3, 2006), available at 
https://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/prb040306dm.pdf [hereinafter Marchick‟s Remarks] (noting that 
“in some sectors in which the U.S. leads the world, such as the chemicals sector, foreign affiliates are responsible for 
almost 30% of the total value created in the U.S. The stock of foreign direct investment in the U.S. has grown from 
$185 billion in 1985 to more than $1.5 trillion today.” Marchick argues that “actions to restrict foreign investment in 
the United States could lead to retaliation against, or imitation that hurts, U.S. investors abroad. Nevertheless, the 
levels of foreign investment in the United States remain relatively low compared to other major industrialized 
countries.” According to Marchick, due to the current account deficit the U.S. needs more foreign investment, not 
less. In order to eliminate the deficit, “the United States must import more than $2 billion of capital per day. If the 
investment environment in the United States is hostile for foreign investment, investors will put their money, jobs 
and technology in other economies).” See also, Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: Exhibit 
5 – Exports, Imports and Trade Balance of Goods (April 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/exh5.pdf (indicating that from Jan. to April 2008, the U.S. exported 
$110,338 million and imported $180,912 million in goods) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Statistics]. 
4  See generally Marchick, supra 2. 
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 to address national security threats involved in certain foreign 
investment transactions.  
National security concerns justify governmental intervention in certain foreign 
investment transactions, but the U.S. must balance that concern with maintaining an open foreign 
investment policy. The fear that foreign entities could control American “strategic” industries 
triggered many legislative attempts to prevent such control.
6
 These attempts started to shape up 
more clearly in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s amidst fears of “the Japanese dominance” and investments 
from OPEC countries.
7
 The September 11, 2001, attacks most recently made the U.S. suspicious 
of the outside world, and fearful for its homeland security. The risk of an unsafe homeland 
became too real in 2005 when the Dubai World Port, a United Arab Emirates government 
company, acquired the rights to manage six main ports in the U.S. Congress reacted almost 
immediately and not long after the deal fell through it enacted FINSA. FINSA is a federal statute 
that allows the President to block or suspend transactions involving foreign investors when the 
transaction imposes a national security risk. From the U.S. perspective, FINSA provides the 
framework to ensure that foreign companies do not divest the U.S. of its critical infrastructure, 
technology, and defense industry through investment in the U.S. From the foreign investors‟ 
perspectives, FINSA burdens foreign investment transactions and allows political pressure to 
obstruct economically efficient and beneficial transactions.  
                                                        
5 Pub. L. No. 110-49, §§ 2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 
(2000)). 
6 See generally, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
53-54 (Institute for International Economics 1995). 
7 See infra notes 9-13 (noting that until 1988 the main U.S. legislation regarding foreign investment was the 1917 
Trading with the Enemy Act, the 1975 Executive Order 11,858 creating the CFIUS, and the 1977 International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act). 
VOLUME 2 Winter 2011  ISSUE 1 
4 
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL 
 
This article argues that FINSA‟s framework allows political and protectionist 
considerations to interfere with and potentially erode the U.S. free foreign investment policy. 
Part II of this article provides relevant historical and legislative background about FINSA and the 
policy underlying it. Next, it provides information about post-9/11 enforcement of foreign 
investment regulations and how these regulations have been strengthening up to FINSA. Finally, 
Part II analyzes FINSA‟s key terms and the risks associated with its broad scope and lack of 
clear guidance on how to assess national security threats. Part III argues that FINSA‟s lack of 
guidance regarding the national security analysis allows protectionist concerns and political 
influences to undermine free investment and principals of laissez-faire economics. Secondly, 
Part III argues that although national security is a paramount concern, U.S. politicians unjustly 
rely on it for political reasons when no national security threat exists. Finally, Part III suggests 
that Congress can improve FINSA by focusing on real national security risks, limiting 
congressional involvement, and creating a “fast-track” analysis for passive investment. 
  II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Exon-Florio Regulatory Framework 
1. Where it all began: Creating the CFIUS  
Throughout U.S. history, policymakers have manifested concern about foreign 
investments‟ potential adverse effects on national security.
8
 This history dates back to World 
War I when the U.S. passed legislation restricting foreign ownership of strategic industry sectors 
                                                        
8 See, e.g., Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: the New Barbarians at the Gate? An Analysis of the Legal 
and Business Implications of their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 97, 107-08 (2009) (discussing the historical 
public concern on foreign investment‟s effect on national security). 
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such as shipping and civil aviation.
9
 Concerned with investments from OPEC countries in the 
1970‟s Congress enacted the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (“IEEPA”).
10
 
IEEPA allows the president to seize foreign assets only when he or she declares a state of 
national emergency.
11
 Thus, the President may regulate foreign acquisition of U.S. companies 
through IEEPA, but doing so requires the declaration of a national emergency against the foreign 
investor‟s government. Historically, U.S. presidents have been reluctant to invoke IEEPA 
because the national emergency declaration is akin to a declaration of hostilities against the 
investor‟s country.
12
 Thus, the national emergency requirement made IEEPA applicable only to 
extreme situations, but inadequate to regulate the great majority of foreign investment operations 
(even when national security might be involved). Due to IEEPA‟s diplomatic and political 
drawbacks, the president and Congress sought alternative mechanisms to regulate foreign 
investment in the U.S. 
                                                        
9 See generally MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1914-1945 634 
(Harvard Studies in Business History 2004) (listing the principal legislation affecting foreign investment in the U.S. 
from 1914-1945, including: the 1914/1916 Shipping Act; 1917 Espionage Act, and the Trading with the Enemy 
Act). For further discussions on World War I legislation regarding foreign assets in the United States see James F. F. 
Carroll, Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act’s Conception of National 
Security, 23 EMORY INT‟L L. REV. 167, 170-72 (2009) (discussing the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) passed 
in 1917 during World War I. The TWEA authorized the President to nationalize the assets of U.S. subsidiaries of 
German firms and gave the president broad power to stop any transaction with a foreign country as he saw fit. The 
TWEA‟s current version is codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2006)). 
10 Pub. L. No. 95-223, title II §§ 202-07, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.§§ 1701-06 (2006) 
[hereinafter IEEPA]. 
11 IEEPA § 1701(a)-(b) (stating in relevant part: “[a]ny authority granted to the President [herein] may be exercised 
to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat [ ] to the [U.S] national security, foreign policy, or economy if the 
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, IEEPA 
authorizes the president to investigate, regulate, or prohibit any acquisition of any property in which a foreign 
country or national has any interest. See IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(B).  
12 See Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is Too Much?, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 325, 334 (2007) (noting that presidents have been reluctant to invoke IEEPA in the great majority of 
transactions because doing so would be akin to “a declaration of hostilities against the government of the acquirer 
company” (quoting Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investments 
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT‟L L. 1, 69 (1989)). Stagg further points out that 
the declaration of national emergency requirement made IEEPA inadequate to meet the demands on the president to 
regulate foreign investments that affect national security. 
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 In the 1980‟s Congress feared “the Japanese dominance” and was apprehensive about 
the inadequate mechanisms to review foreign transactions
13
 in the U.S.
14
 In response to this 
political pressure President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11,858, creating the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).
15
  The CFIUS is an inter-agency body 
within the Executive Branch, initially responsible for monitoring the impact of foreign 
investment in the United States and implementing foreign investment policies.
16
 The Department 
of Treasury is the CFIUS‟ chair. The Committee consisted originally of six members, but today 
it is composed of fourteen member-agencies and departments, including the Departments of 
Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
17
  
Executive Order 11,858 did not grant the President or CFIUS authority to block or 
suspend any foreign investment transactions. The agency‟s role was merely to review 
transactions involving the takeover of U.S. companies by foreign individuals
18
 and to evaluate 
whether the transaction generally would impose any threat to national security.
19
 Ultimately, 
CFIUS‟ served the limited role to alert the government of potential problems with certain 
transactions. Any decision regarding government intervention in individual transactions was left 
to Congress (political process), or solved by the application of antitrust or alternative laws.
20
  
                                                        
13  For purposes of this article the term “transaction” refers collectively to an acquisition, merger, or takeover of a 
U.S. company by a foreign company or individual. 
14 See Joanna Rubin Travalini, Comment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a Balance 
Between National Economy Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT‟L L. & BUS. 779, 783 (2009) 
(commenting on U.S. history in regulating foreign investment). 
15 Executive Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975) [hereinafter Executive Order 11,858], (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006)). 
16 Executive Order 11,858 § 1.  
17 CFIUS Home Page, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-
Investment-in-US.aspx (follow “Composition of CFIUS” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
18 For purposes of this article the term “individual” refers to both natural persons and legal entities. 
19 Executive Order 11,858 § 1(b), (c).  
20 See Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-
Floxio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 849, 857 (2006). 
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This initial CFIUS role was sufficient to make Congress comfortable that at least some 
mechanism monitored foreign investment.  However, the change in the political-economic 
context since Executive Order 11,858 and heightened fear of foreign dominance of U.S. assets 
led to legislative initiatives to increase the CFIUS‟ powers and Congress‟ oversight. Three 
Congressional bills have affected the CFIUS‟s operation: (1) the Exon-Florio Amendment; (2) 
the Byrd Amendment; and (3) FINSA. This article focuses on FINSA, however a background on 
the Exon-Florio is particularly important to understanding FINSA. 
2. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act 
The Exon-Florio Amendment was passed as part of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988
21
 (“Exon-Florio”) to amend § 721 of the Defense Production Act of 
1950.
22
  Exon-Florio expanded CFIUS‟s role by authorizing the President to suspend or prohibit 
any transactions leading to the control of U.S. companies by foreign persons when: (1) there is 
credible evidence of national security threats and; (2) when other legislation cannot provide 
“adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect national security.”
23
 The 
dramatic increase of foreign ownership of U.S. assets in the mid 1980‟s yielded anti-foreign 
sentiments, which reflect the socio-political context of Exon-Florio‟s passage.
24
 At that time the 
                                                        
21 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988). Congress named Exon-Florio after its primary 
sponsors, Sen. John James Exon (D-NE) and Rep. James J. Florio (D-N.J.). For more information on Sen. Exon see 
Associated Press, Former Senator J. James Exon, 83, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/13/politics/13exon.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Senator%20James%20Exon&st=cse. 
22 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
23 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021(d)(1)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (noting that the literal language of the 
statute allows the president to act under Exon-Florio upon credible evidence of national security threat and when 
“provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act do not [ ] provide 
adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect national security”).  
24 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 172-73.  
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public opinion discussed the potential negative impacts of foreign investment, such as adverse 
effects on domestic employment and trade, political process, and national security.
25
   
Japan attracted special attention from Congress because of its growing presence as a 
successful investor in the U.S. automobile and banking sectors.
26
 This background set the stage 
for the case that provided the principal impetus for the Exon-Florio‟s passage: the 1987 proposed 
sale of the U.S-based chip maker Fairchild Semiconductor Company (“Fairchild”) to the 
Japanese-based computer maker Fujitsu Corporation (“Fujitsu”).
27
 As a major supplier of chips 
to the U.S. military, Fairchild was a strategic company to the U.S. defense industry. The 
potential Japanese control over such a strategic U.S. company raised several national security 
concerns.
28
 Congress disliked the deal and vociferated national security concerns and political 
pressure to terminate the transaction.
29
 Due to the political pressure and negative publicity over 
the deal, Fujitsu withdrew its bid for Fairchild.
30
 President Reagan could have blocked the 
transaction under the IEEPA, but he was reluctant to declare a state of emergency against Japan, 
a Cold War ally.
31
 
Even though the Fujitsu-Fairchild deal fell through, Congress was displeased with 
President Reagan‟s reluctance to block the deal. Congress wanted a stronger mechanism to 
                                                        
25 See Graham & Krugman, supra note 6, at 3-5.  
26
 Id. at 53-54 (noting that Honda Motor Company and five other Japanese manufacturers yielded 21.8% of the 
automobile production in the U.S. in 1992. The Japanese presence in the banking sector exceeded this percentage). 
27 THEODORE H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CFIUS PROCESS 9 (Peter G. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics 2009). 
28 Id.  
29 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 173. 
30 See Donna K. H. Walters, Deal to Sell Fairchild Semiconductor to Fujitsu Canceled, L.A. TIMES, March 17, 
1987, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1987-03-17/business/fi-12290_1_fairchild-semiconductor (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2010). 
31 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 173 (noting that IEEPA‟s wording – requiring a state of emergency declaration - 
essentially made the presidential veto untenable for all but the most extreme transactions). 
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oversee similar transactions, and as a result it proposed the Exon-Florio bill.
32
 The early 
Congressional discussions about the Exon-Florio show Congress‟ “long-range concerns 
regarding economic and political independence, [as well as national security].”
33
  The House 
Committee Report regarding House Bill 3 and section 907 (one of the early versions of the Exon-
Florio Amendment) pointed to the proposed takeover of Fairchild by Fujitsu as an example of a 
transaction detrimental to national security.
34
  
When the bill reached the Senate some Senators ardently supported it, but others 
criticized the inclusion of broad economic factors, such as “economic security” and “national 
unemployment” in the determination of a transaction‟s effect on national security.
35
 The 
Executive branch and others who opposed the original bill feared that it could impede beneficial 
foreign investment.
36
 After long debates and President Reagan‟s threat to veto the bill, Congress 
passed a final version that excluded the broad commercial regulation provisions.
37
 Congress 
attached the Exon-Florio to the Defense Production Act of 1950 to limit it to the national security 
context.
38
 Following the enactment of Exon-Florio
39
 President Reagan issued Executive Order 
                                                        
32 Id. 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt.2, at 47 (1987).  
34 H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt.2, at 48 (1987) (the Committee argued that semiconductors were essential to national 
defense, and its loss to a foreign country would be disastrous). 
35 See id. at pt. 2 at 25 (statement of Sen. James J. Exon). See also Federal Collection of Information on Foreign 
Investment in the U.S.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 100th Cong. 10 (1988) 
(statement of John W. Bryant, Rep. from Texas); Byrne, supra note 20, at 862-63 (discussing the broad “essential 
commerce” and “economic welfare” goals that were proposed as part of the CFIUS‟s review process, but which 
were ultimately rejected); Carroll, supra note 9, at 174. 
36 See Howard E. O‟Leary & Judy Parker Jenkins, “Exon-Florio”: An Impediment to Foreign  Investment in the 
United States?, 69 MICH. B. J. 680, 681 (1990) (criticizing Exon-Florio). 
37 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401 (1987); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2901 
(1988). 
38 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401. 
39 50. U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
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12,661 delegating to CFIUS his authority to examine transactions for national security concerns 
and retaining the power to suspend or prohibit a transaction.
40
   
The U.S. had its first major systematic regulation of foreign investment. For the first time 
Congress expressly authorized the President to block specific private transactions on national 
security grounds, without having to declare emergency or hostilities against the investor‟s 
country. Under Exon-Florio, the President or his designee-CFIUS has broad authority to 
investigate the national security effects of transactions by or with foreign individuals that could 
result in foreign control of U.S companies.
41
 Not surprisingly “control” includes any type of 
arrangement that would allow the foreign investor to direct the decisions of the acquired 
American entity,
42
 which illustrates the broad sweep of the statute. 
a. Exon-Florio’s CFIUS Review Process in a Nutshell 
The Exon-Florio review process starts with the filing of a voluntary notice to CFIUS by 
the parties to a covered transaction.
43
 The filing must contain a description of the transaction, 
appropriate timelines, a list of target assets, and the parties‟ detailed background.
44
 The CFIUS 
has thirty days to determine whether to conduct an investigation.
45
 Each CFIUS member 
(agencies and departments) conducts its own internal analysis and presents its conclusions to the 
Committee.  If the CFIUS finds at this point that the transaction does not pose any national 
security threat, it will not conduct any further investigation and the parties may consummate the 
deal without U.S. interference on the grounds of national security. However, if the CFIUS 
                                                        
40 Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).  
41 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 1991 & Supp. 2009). 
42 See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2005). 
43 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a)(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 2009)  (defining “covered transaction” as a merger, 
acquisition, or takeover by or with foreign persons, which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in 
interstate commerce). 
44 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 785. 
45 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E). 
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determines that an investigation is warranted, then it must investigate the deal and reach a 
conclusion within forty-five days.
46
 Within fifteen days after completion of the investigation, the 
President must announce whether or not to block the transaction.
47
 In order to block a transaction 
the President must find credible evidence that the transaction would impair national security and 




Although the Exon-Florio language does not mandate the CFIUS notification filing, 
failure to do so  allows the President to take the extreme measure of post-consummation 
divestiture.
49
 The practical result is that most parties to a proposed foreign acquisition file 
notifications expecting to obtain CFIUS clearance to avoid, or at least minimize, future risks of 
divestiture.
50
 This is illustrated by the two hundred notifications filed in 1989 compared to just 
fourteen notifications in filed in 1988, the year of Exon-Florio‟s enactment.
51
  
b. Exon-Florio’s National Security and Confidentiality Provisions 
The Exon-Florio does not define the term “national security,” nor did the regulations that 
followed the Amendment.
52
 Congress did this intentionally so that national security remained a 
broad and flexible concept so the law did not stifle the President‟s ability to affirmatively act.
53
 
The government anticipated that any definition of national security would give foreign entities 
                                                        
46 Id. at §2170(b)(2)(C). 
47 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d)(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 2010). 
48 Id. § 2170(d). 
49 Id. 
50 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT – IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO 
& RELATED AMENDMENTS 3 (1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96012.pdf [hereinafter GAO 
1995 Report]. 
51 Id. at 4. 
52 31 C.F.R. § 800 app. A, § II (2005) 
53 Id. 
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and sophisticated attorneys the opportunity to structure transactions to get around the definition 
thereby creating a loophole.
54
 
The Exon-Florio laid out several factors to test whether a transaction related to national 
security. The factors assess whether: (1) the deal affects domestic production needed for 
projected national defense; (2) the transaction affects the capability and capacity of domestic 
industries to meet national defense; and (3) whether foreign citizens‟ control of domestic 
industries affects the United States‟ capability to meet national security requirements.
55
  
 It is unclear how the CFIUS weighs and analyzes each factor because Exon-Florio has a 
confidentiality provision, which prevents public release of detailed information on CFIUS-
reviewed transactions.
56
 Thus, most of CFIUS‟ review process information is not publicly 
available, and much of the information that becomes available is often provided by the very 
companies involved in the transactions. The 1995 Exon-Florio report to Congress suggests that 
an important factor the Committee takes into consideration is the possibility that foreign 
countries gain control over key industries critical to national security.
57
 Consequently, the 
government focuses on the preservation and promotion of its leadership in technologies that are 
crucial to the U.S. defense system.
58
 Even though these factors are helpful in identifying CFIUS‟ 
issues based on the industry sector targeted by the investor, they still do not provide very clear 
guidelines. Thus the analysis of two landmark Exon-Florio transactions helps to shed some light 
into how the government enforces the Amendment. 
                                                        
54 Byrne, supra note 20, at 867. 
55 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (e)(1)-(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 2010). 
56 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(c) (2006) (stating in relevant part: “[a]ny information or documentary material filed with 
[the CFIUS] pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure…and no such information or documentary 
material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding”). 
57 See GAO 1995 Report, supra note 50, at 2. 
58 Id. 
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c. The CATIC-MAMCO Transaction 
 On November 3, 1989 MAMCO Manufacturing Inc. (“MAMCO”) filed a voluntary 
notification to CFIUS about its proposed sale to China National Aero-Technology Import & 
Export Corporation‟s (“CATIC”).
59
 MAMCO was a Seattle based U.S. aircraft parts 
manufacturer, which had never exported any of its products. CATIC was a People‟s Republic of 
China government-related manufacturer of civilian and military aircrafts, aircraft engines, and 
missiles.
60
 During the 30-day review process, CFIUS raised national security issues because it 
was concerned that sensitive technology held by MAMCO would be transferred to CATIC 
absent export controls.
61
  Before the CFIUS completed the takeover review, CATIC purchased 
all MAMCO‟s voting securities, completing the transaction.
62
  
Shortly after the transaction‟s closing, the CFIUS unanimously concluded that it posed 
national security threats. The Committee reasoned that: (1) CATIC had ties to the Chinese 
military; (2) the transaction would give CATIC “unique access” to U.S. aerospace companies; 
and (3) some of the technology produced by MAMCO was export-controlled.
63
  On February 3, 
1990 the New York Times reported that “Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation 
Concern to China.”
64
 Based on CFIUS‟ unanimous recommendations President George H. W. 
Bush ordered the divestiture of MAMCO by CATIC. Some speculated that CATIC‟s past actions 
                                                        
59 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATEMENT OF ALLAN I. MENDELOWITZ DIRECTOR INT‟L TRADE, 
ENERGY, AND FIN. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROT. AND COMPETITIVENESS 4 
(1990) [hereinafter Allan Mendelowitz‟s Statement], http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140886.pdf. 
60 Nuclear Threat Initiative - CATIC‟s profile, http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/China/index.html (last visited 
on Nov. 12, 2010). 
61 Allan Mendelowitz‟s Statement, supra note 59, at 5. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Byrne, supra note 20, at 872. 
64 Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation Concern to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
1990, at 1. 
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and connections to the Chinese government motivated the President‟s decision.
65
 Because of the 
Exon-Florio‟s confidentiality provision the public will never ascertain Bush‟s actual motivation. 
The CATIC-MAMCO deal was the first and only transaction that a president has ever formally 
blocked after a negative recommendation from CFIUS.
66
 
d. The Thomson-CSF and LTV Corporation Transaction 
 In 1992 Congress and the national media paid close attention to another extremely 
controversial CFIUS transaction. Thomson-CSF, Inc. (“Thomson”), a French government-owned 
company participated in a complex bidding process to acquire LTV Corporation (“LTV”), a U.S. 
company that owned an aerospace division. The LTV missile division‟s primary customer was 
the U.S. government and LTV held classified Department of Defense (“DOD”) contracts.
67
 LTV 
filed for bankruptcy and needed to raise cash. In order to obtain liquidity, the Bankruptcy Court 
in New York approved the sale of LTV‟s missile division and considered proposals from 
Thomson, Martin Marietta (a U.S. Aerospace company), and Lockheed (a U.S-owned 
company).
68
 The Court hesitated to consider Thomson‟s bid because of the risk that CFIUS 
would not approve the transaction.
69
 However, Thomson was confident that it would secure 
CFIUS clearance and it made an offer to pay LTV a $20 million “reverse break-up fee” in the 
event it failed to close the transaction due to inability to obtain U.S. approval.
70
  
Thomson‟s bid won and the company filed a CFIUS notice regarding the takeover. 
Meanwhile Congress and the Pentagon expressed concerns about the potential leakage of LTV‟s 
                                                        
65 Id. 
66 See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – PUBLIC 
VERSION 2 (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-
Annual-Rpt-2008.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS 2008 report](last visited on Jan. 8, 2011). 
67 In Re Chateaugay, 198 B.R. 848, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
68 See Moran, supra note 27, at 16. 
69 In Re Chateaugay, 198 B.R. at 852. 
70 Id. 
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classified information and defense technology to Thomson‟s parent company in France.
71
  
Numerous members of Congress strongly objected to the acquisition and proposed at least a few 
bills designed to block the deal.
72
   
Martin Marietta (Thomson‟s U.S. competitor) used the national security argument to 
fight Thomson‟s takeover and to try to get back into the bidding process.
73
 Marietta argued that 
Thomson had sold military equipment to Iraq in the past, and could easily sell LTV‟s technology 
to a U.S. enemy again following consummation of the deal.
74
  Congress held multiple hearings 
about the Thomson-LTV deal and continued to pressure both the CFIUS and Thomson. The 
DOD conducted extensive negotiations with Thomson regarding potential mitigation agreements 
To prevent Thomson‟s access to LTV‟s export-controlled information, “the DOD conducted 
extensive negotiations with Thomson regarding potential mitigation agreements.”  However, 
they failed to reach an agreement.
75
 Ultimately the DOD strongly opposed the transaction 
because Thomson had provided radar equipment to Iraq during the Gulf War, implicating what 
the DOD deemed a national security risk.
76
   
Thompson finally accepted the defeat in its attempt to acquire LTV and withdrew from 
the CFIUS process. CFIUS never issued a formal opinion disapproving the Thomson-LTV deal. 
However, Congress‟ pressure, the public opinion, and the political context strongly support the 
inference that CFIUS would issue a negative recommendation. As a final defeat to Thomson, the 
Bankruptcy court enforced the “reverse break-up fee” provision of the bid and forced Thomson 
                                                        
71 Moran, supra note 27, at 16. 
72 See Eric Schmitt, G.A.O. Investigator Opposes LTV Unit Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992 at D4. 
73 Byrne, supra note 20, at 873. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 873-874. 
76 Id. at 874. 
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to pay $20 million to LTV.
77
 This outcome undoubtedly defeated Thomson and sent a clear 
message to foreign investors interested in purchasing U.S. defense industry companies. 
Nevertheless Congress remained dissatisfied and anticipated that other transactions involving a 
foreign government could occur without appropriate review mechanisms. Thus, it decided to 
strengthen the Exon-Florio.  
e. The Byrd Amendment 
In immediate response to the Thomson-LTV landmark case, Congress passed the Byrd 
Amendment (“Byrd Amendment”) to section 721 of the Defense Production Act. This 
Amendment mandates CFIUS investigation of: (1) any transaction involving an entity controlled 
or acting on behalf of a foreign government; (2) seeking to acquire control of an American 
company; (3) which “could affect” U.S. national security.
78
 This section lowered the standard 
that would trigger a review of an acquisition from a “threat to national security” standard used 
for private business to the “could affect” national security standard for foreign-government 
related transactions. The loosening of this provision indicates a high likelihood that CFIUS will 
review any foreign-government transaction involving a U.S. business.
79
 It also suggests that 
CFIUS could easily classify any transaction by, with, or involving a foreign government as a 
national security threat.  
Additionally, the Byrd Amendment added two more factors to the Exon-Florio‟s original 
list of national security assessment factors. Under the Byrd Amendment, CFIUS can consider the 
                                                        
77 See In Re Chateaugay Corp., No. 96-5110, 1997 WL 138384, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1997) (upholding the 
enforcement of the reverse break up fee and finding it irrelevant, for purposes of the purchase contract (bid), that 
Thomson used its best efforts to try to reach a deal with, and obtain approval from the government). Thomson 
challenged the enforceability of the reserve breakup fee, since it was unable to perform its purchasing obligations 
due to governmental opposition to the deal. Id. However, the court affirmed the imposition of the contractual fee. Id. 
78 National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, §837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463-65 
(1992) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006)). 
79 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 176. 
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transaction‟s potential effect on various military sales to foreign countries and its potential effect 
on the U.S.‟s technological leadership role in the area.
80
  The “potential effect” language makes 
it easier for CFIUS to reject transactions that might eventually affect military sales or the U.S. 
technological leadership, without the need to assess the actual likelihood that it could occur. 
Finally, the Byrd Amendment requires that CFIUS send a report to Congress at the 
conclusion of any investigation 
81
 to allow Congress to exert political pressure in the CFIUS‟ 
Exon-Florio implementation. The Byrd Amendment also requires the President to report to 
Congress  as to whether credible evidence of a foreign coordinated strategy to acquire U.S. 
critical technology companies, or industrial espionage exists.
82
 The higher scrutiny levels and the 
Congressional notification provisions sent a clear message to CFIUS that Congress would 
carefully observe and review CFIUS‟ recommendations and decisions.  
 
 
B. Post 9/11 Application of Exon-Florio: Finding the Balance Between  
National Security and Open Foreign Investment 
 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has heightened 
national security standards and has reviewed foreign-related transactions with greater scrutiny.
83
 
A primary theme in recent U.S. government practices includes a stronger defensive position and 
broader security measures.
84
 The 9/11 attacks changed the paradigm of state-actors‟ security 
threats to non-state actors‟ security threats.  As described by Travalini,  “the CFIUS responded to 
the threat of terrorism by tightening the requirements for approval of foreign acquisitions and 
                                                        
80 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(4)-(5). 
81 See id. § 2170(b)(3)(A). 
82 Id. § 2170(m)(3)(A)(ii). 
83 Travalini, supra note 14, at 787. 
84 Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward Deployment of the U.S. 
Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 200-01 (2007). 
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adding the Department of Homeland Security to its membership in 2003.”
85
 Despite this higher 
standard of scrutiny, the official statistics show that most transactions are likely to obtain CFIUS 
approval, which has been a point of criticism to the CFIUS.
86
  However, many of these approvals 
have been conditioned to the foreign investor‟s willingness to enter into mitigation agreements. 
Mitigation agreements involve a broad range of measures to restrict or limit the foreign 
investor‟s control over the acquire business.  Such agreement can require the purchaser to 
provide representations and assurances to the CFIUS, as well as voting control mechanisms (to 
limit or eliminate control of the U.S. entity by the foreign investor).
87
 From 1997 to 2008 the 
government entered into fifty-two mitigation agreements.
88
 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government has fought to achieve a balance between 
increasing national security protection through foreign investment regulation and maintaining 
investment freedom.
89
 Many post 9/11 transactions have raised Congressional concerns over the 
quality of the CFIUS and Exon-Florio‟s analytical scheme. It seems that national security is not 
only a legitimate concern of the highest order, but also a reason for the government to intervene 
in private transactions involving unpopular foreign investors.  
Selective involvement in such transactions may have occurred in 2005 when the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) made an $18.5 billion cash bid for the 
California-based oil company Unocal Corporation (“Unocal”).
90
 When CNOOC publicly 
                                                        
85 Travalini, supra note 14, at 787. 
86 See GAO 1995 Report, supra note 50, at 4. CFIUS 2008 Report, supra note 66, at 15. 
87 See CFIUS 2008 Report, supra note 66, at 15.  
88 Id.  
89 Travalini, supra note 14, at 787. 
90 See Moran, supra note 27, at 18-19 (analyzing the CNOOC proposed purchase of Unocal and concluding that a 
less superficial analysis would have led to the conclusion that there was no real national security threat related to the 
transaction). Moran points out that oil supply sources were not tightly concentrated and switching costs were not 
high. Thus even it the deal went through, the U.S. would have had 21 countries (including 15 non-OPEC countries) 
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announced the bid, Congress was outraged and expressed serious concerns regarding the 
possibility that a foreign investor could take control of a domestic energy company. It urged 
strict CFIUS review of the deal and expressed its concern “about China‟s ongoing and proposed 
acquisition of energy assets around the world, including those in the United States.”
91
 According 
to Congress introduced various bills that could have prevented the transaction and it conducted 
hearings regarding potential changes to the Exon-Florio.
92
 CNOOC ultimately withdrew its bid 
due to the “political environment in the United States.”
93
 Instead of the deal receiving an 
objective evaluation into the possible risks, the political climate thwarted the purchaser from 
pursuing the deal. The American Chevron Corporation took advantage of the negative publicity 
and security concerns and purchased Unocal.
94
 The termination of this deal sent another clear 
message to foreign investors that they would incur significant political opposition if they attempt 
to invest in the U.S. energy industry.  
1. The Dubai Ports World and P&O Steam Navigation Transaction 
“Don‟t let them tell you this is just the transfer of title.  
Baloney. We wouldn‟t transfer title to the Devil;  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that would have immediate availability of oil to export to the U.S. Such alternative supply sources were greater than 
Unocal‟s entire U.S. production. Additionally, six more countries could be called on to make up for large portion of 
Unocal‟s U.S. output. The result is that U.S. buyers would simply replace Unocal‟s “minuscule” production with 
extra imports without a great economic impact. Finally Moran argues that the U.S. energy needs would have been 
better served by energy policies that promote efficiency and stimulate new energy sources rather than focusing on 
blocking deals of this kind).  Id. 
91 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 788 (citing Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic 
Assets:  The Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 LAW & 
BUS. REV. AM. 381, 382 (2007).  
92 Byrne, supra note 20, at 876. 
93 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 789 (citing Gauray Sud, From Takeovers to Vetting CIFUS:  Finding a Balance in 
U.S. Policy Regarding Foreging Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNT‟L L. 1303, 1306 (2006); 
Carroll, supra note 9, at 181-82 (pointing out that the opponents to the CNOOC-Unocal deal‟s main argument was 
that the purchase would “give China more leverage over the international oil market, and regardless of the facts to 
this specific transaction, the symbolic nature of giving in to China‟s resource goals should be prevented at all costs.” 
“Unsurprisingly, hawkish arguments toward China played a large role in congressional opposition to the deal.” Id. at 
181.  He further points out that energy companies have no direct connection to the military, and could not impose 
any direct threat to the U.S. economy or national security).  Id. at 181-182. 
94 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 789.Id. 
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Not long after the CNOOC-Unocal transaction fell through, Congress faced another 
challenge in balancing national security concerns with foreign investment. Dubai Ports World 
(“DPW”), a United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) government-owned company entered into an 
agreement to purchase London-based Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
(“P&O”). The British-P&O managed the operation of six major U.S. ports, including New York, 
Baltimore and Miami.
96
 In October 2005 the two companies informally informed CFIUS that 
they would seek review of the transaction.
97
 The CFIUS then requested an intelligence 
assessment of DPW, which showed that DPW had neither the intention nor the capability to 
threaten U.S. national security.
98
 CFIUS did not identify national security issues in this 
transaction because DPW would neither be in charge of the ports themselves nor port security. 
Rather, it would manage terminal port operations without acquiring the ports themselves.
99
 
Moreover, the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection would remain in charge 
of port security. Based on this previous assessment, DPW and P&O filed their formal notices 
with the CFIUS requesting review of the transaction on December 16, 2005.
100
  
On January 17, 2006 the CFIUS announced its approval of the transaction, and on 
February 24 it issued a press release in a public acknowledgment of the transaction‟s approval.
101
 
This was very unusual considering the Exon-Florio‟s confidentiality provision requiring all 
                                                        
95 Moran, supra note 27, at 24 (citing Senator Frank Lautenberg‟s (D-NJ) statement about the DPW-P&O deal).  
96 Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operation, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2006, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR2006030901124.html. 
97 Travalini, supra note 14, at 789. 
98 Press Release, Dep‟t of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the Dubai Ports World 
Bid for Ports Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
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investigations to remain unavailable to the public. Congress voiced strong concerns that the 
CFIUS review neglected national security considerations.
102
 Critics to the transaction argued that 
UAE had a history as an operational and financial base for hijackers who carried out the 9/11 
attacks.
103
 They further argued that DPW could be influenced by Al-Qaeda into weakening ports‟ 
security.
104
 Even though DPW offered assurances that its key employees in the U.S. would be 
American citizens, and it committed to the additional 45-day CFIUS review period, the 
transaction simply could not overcome Congress‟ opposition.
105
 Some members of Congress 
proposed emergency legislation with antiterrorism appeal.
106
 President George W. Bush 
supported the deal and threatened to veto any congressional action blocking it. However, after 
several weeks of controversy, political pressure and negative publicity, DPW decided to drop its 
bid. It sold P&O‟s American port operations to American International Group (“AIG”).
107
 
 After the DPW incident Congress deemed the CFIUS review under Exon-Florio 
inadequate to protect national security under the current state of affairs of terrorist threats. In an 
attempt to expand the scope of foreign investment regulation Congress prepared another 
amendment to Exon-Florio, broadening the interpretation of national security. 
C. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
“Unless the United States continues to welcome foreign investment, 
[it] could find [itself] more and more isolated in an increasingly 
interdependent world. Maintaining an open environment for 
investment is, in itself, deeply in the national security interest of the 
                                                        
102 See Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a Tempest 
in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 606 (2007). 
103 Id. 
104 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 184. 
105 Mostaghel, supra note 102, at 609-10. 
106 Id. at 612 (discussing the legislation proposed to prohibit the DPW-P&O transaction, and prevent sales of U.S. 
port operations to companies with foreign ownership). 
107 See Joan Gralla, AIG NY-NJ OK Pact with DP World for Newark Port, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www. reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN1665883120070218. 
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On July 26, 2007 President Bush signed the FINSA into law.
109
 FINSA amends the 
Defense Production Act of 1950 and replaces many of Exon-Florio‟s provisions. FINSA 
represents a victory for Congress in the long-running struggle to expand the covered transactions, 
broaden the national security concept and increase congressional oversight. FINSA keeps the 




The main additions brought in by FINSA can be summarized as follows: (1) it expands 
the concept of national security to include issues relating to “homeland security”;
111
 (2) expands 
„covered transactions‟ to include transactions involving „critical infrastructure‟;
112
 (3) includes 
additional factors that CFIUS might consider in its assessment of national security threats;
113
 (4) 
expressly authorizes CFIUS to require mitigation agreements and monitor compliance;
114
 (5) 
prohibits notice withdrawals without CFIUS prior approval;
115
 (7) expands Congressional access 
to CFIUS transactions‟ specific information;
116
 and (8) provides for civil penalties if parties to a 
                                                        
108 Marchick‟s Remarks, supra note 3, at 3. 
109 Pub. L. No. 110-49, §§ 2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000)). 
110 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k) (codifying the CFIUS, establishing its membership, role, and authority in the 
implementation of Exon-Florio); See also Stagg, supra note 12, at 351 (arguing that CFIUS‟s statutory 
establishment strengthened its authority and “prompted companies to be more receptive to its requirement”).  
111 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5). 
112 See Id. at § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(III). 
113 Id. § 2170(f)(6)-(10). 
114 See Id. §§ 2170(l), 2170(l)(3)(B)(ii). 
115 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(ii). 
116 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(b)(3)(A)-(C), 2170(m)(1)-(2) (subsection 2 states the content requirements of the annual 
reports that CFIUS shall issue to Congress, which include, inter alia: a list of all notices filed and all reviews or 
investigations completed in the period; a detailed discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions 
on the national security or critical infrastructure of the United States; specific cumulative and, as appropriate, trend 
information on the business sectors involved and the countries from which the investments have been made). 
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transaction violate FINSA and/or mitigation agreements.
117
 The additional factors that CFIUS 
can consider in its national security analysis under FINSA specifically target, inter alia, 
situations that involve terrorist-related parties or countries. For example, the statute allows the 
CFIUS to consider whether the foreign government involved in the transaction has adhered to 
non-proliferation regimes, as well as that country‟s relationship with the U.S. (specifically in 
regards to “cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts”).
118
 
FINSA maintains the Exon-Florio provision that precludes judicial review of any 
findings regarding national security, and actions blocking or suspending reviewed 
transactions.
119
 The obvious result is that foreign investors cannot seek relief from CFIUS or 
Presidential decisions in U.S. Courts. FINSA also requires CFIUS to issue guidance on the types 
of reviewed transactions that presented national security and critical infrastructure concerns.
120
 
This is a positive change from the previous statute because it increases transparency and 
advances foreign investors‟ awareness about the threshold of risk deemed acceptable by CFIUS.  
1. Interpreting FINSA’s Key Terms  
 On January 23, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,456 implementing 
FINSA and directing the CFIUS to issue additional regulations.
121
 On November 14, 2008, the 
CFIUS issued the required regulations, which focused heavily in defining “covered transaction” 
                                                        
117 Id. § 2170(h)(3)(A); 31 C.F.R. § 800.801 (a)-(g)(2008) (establishing civil penalties not to exceed $ 250,000 for 
intentional or negligent submission of material misstatements, omissions, false certifications and violation of 
mitigation agreements). 
118 Id. § 2170(f)(9)(A)-(B). 
119 Id. § 2170(e). 
120 Id. §2170(b)(2)(E). 
121 Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (amending Exec. Order 11,858). 
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and “control” under FINSA.
122
 However, the key concept of “national security” remained 
undefined. The following subsections discuss key FINSA terms according to the CFIUS‟ 2008 
regulations.  
a. “National Security” 
Like the situation with Exon-Florio, neither FINSA nor the regulations define the term 
“national security” or the phrase “threatens to impair the national security.”
123
 However, FINSA 
does expand the concept of national security to include “issues relating to „homeland security, 
including its application to critical infrastructure.‟”
124
 Furthermore, the statute defines critical 
infrastructure as a “system or asset, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the [U.S.] that [its] 
incapacity or destruction… would have a debilitating impact on national security” (emphasis 
added).
125
 But this is as far as FINSA and the regulations go into defining national security. 
FINSA instead provides a list of illustrative factors for CFIUS and the President to consider in 
assessing whether the transaction poses national security risks.
126
  
The Exon-Florio and Byrd amendments already covered some of these factors, however 
FINSA added some key factors. Under FINSA, the CFIUS may also consider: (1) the potential 
national security related effects on U.S. critical technologies; (2) the potential effects on the 
long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and 
                                                        
122 See THE DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY, CFIUS REFORM: FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 14 1-2 (2008), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-Final-
Regulations-new.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS Regulations]. 
123 See 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(I). 
124 Id. at §2170(a)(5); See also Moran, supra note 27, at 5 (explaining that “critical” and “essential” are introduced 
by FINSA without qualification, leaving the potential for protectionist mischief. Under the current unqualified 
standard the door is open for assertions that every “critical” and “essential” industry sector should be kept in the 
hands of home-country citizens or business.). 
125 See U.S.C. app. §2170(a)(6); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008). 
126 See Guidance Concerning the Nat‟l Sec. Review Conducted by the Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 
73 Fed. Reg. 74,569 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
VOLUME 2 Winter 2011  ISSUE 1 
25 
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL 
 
materials; (3) the potential national security related effects on critical infrastructure including 
major energy assets; (4) the potential effects of the transaction on the sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to countries that present concerns related to terrorism and missile 
proliferation; and (5) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military 
applications, including the relevant country‟s export control system.
127
 
These additional factors clearly provide more information to foreign investors, which 
prior to FINSA, lacked information given the confidential nature of the investigation process.
128
 
Nevertheless, the president retains broad discretion to determine if the transaction presents any 
national security considerations. The CFIUS 2008 Guidance suggests that national security risk 
is a result of the interaction between threat and vulnerability of a particular industry sector, and 
the potential consequences of such interaction to national security.
129
 But there is no simple or 
“CFIUS-proof” standard.  
The intention remains to keep “national security” a broad and flexible concept so that the 
President to can act in his or her discretion whenever necessary to protect the nation. The 
downside of this flexibility is that national security might in many cases turn out to mean 
whatever the President decides it to be under the circumstances, to the detriment of the necessary 
freedom of foreign investment.  
b. “Covered Transaction” and “Control” 
 FINSA defines “covered transaction” as any “merger, acquisition, or takeover…by or 
with any foreign person, which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
                                                        
127  Id. at 74,469-70. 
128 See Stagg, supra note 12, at 348.  
129 Id. 
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commerce in the United States” (emphasis added).
130
 Control is a key threshold concept of 
FINSA because both the CFIUS authority to review a transaction and the president‟s power to 
block it are predicated on foreign control of an American company engaged in interstate 
commerce.  
The regulations define “control” in a very broad manner. Control includes any form of 
direct or indirect power, through ownership of voting interests, or any formal or informal 
contractual arrangement that would otherwise allow the acquiring company to decide important 
matters affecting the target entity.
131
 “Important matters affecting the target entity” relate, but are 
not limited to, its sale, transfer of assets, reorganization, closing, alteration of production, entry 
into, and termination of contracts.
132
 This means that not only mergers and acquisitions are 
subject to analysis, but also the acquisition of stock interests with voting rights, forming a joint 
venture, and the conversion of convertible voting securities.
133
 Control is a case-by-case analysis, 
and neither FINSA nor the regulations specify a certain percentage of shares or number of board 
seats that a foreign investor has to hold in order to have “control” of the U.S. entity.  
On the other hand, an important exception to the covered transactions is the “passive 
investment” scenario. Under the regulations a foreign person does not control an entity if it 
satisfies a two-pronged test. First the CFIUS assess whether a foreign person holds ten percent or 
less of the outstanding voting interest in the entity, second, whether it holds its investment solely 
                                                        
130 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also 31 C.F.R. at § 800.212 (2008) (defining “foreign entity” 
as any entity, group or subdivision thereof, in whatever form organized, with “its principal place of business outside 
the United States or its equity securities primarily traded on one or more foreign exchanges”). 
131 See 31 C.F.R. §800.204 (a)(1)-(10). 
132 Id. (listing all the important matters affecting the target entity, which the CFIUS will consider when assessing 
control). 
133 See also Id. at § 800.204(c)(1)-(6) (excluding from “control” certain minority shareholder protections, i.e., the 
power to prevent an entity from entering into contracts with majority investors); See also §800.204(d) (clarifying 
that the CFIUS will consider on a case-by-case basis whether other non-listed minority shareholder protections do 
not confer control over an entity).  
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for the purpose of passive investment.
134
 Passive investment occurs when the foreign investor 
has no plan or intent to control the entity, or ever develops or possesses any purpose other than 
passive investment.
135
 Even though such passive investment is not a „covered transaction‟ this is 
a determination that the CFIUS will make, not the parties themselves. Thus, the parties to such a 




Finally, foreign investors should be aware that the CFIUS‟s analysis focuses on substance 
over form. This means that the CFIUS will disregard legal devices or other arrangements entered 
into for the purpose of avoiding FINSA. Instead, the CFIUS will analyze the substance of the 
transaction regardless of its legal form.
137
  
c. “Certifications to Congress” 
 FINSA has significantly increased Congress‟ ability to access confidential information 
relating to transactions that have undergone CFIUS review. FINSA provides that upon 
completion of CFIUS investigations, the Secretary of Treasury shall transmit a certified notice 
and subsequent written report to Congress on the results of the investigation.
138
 Each certified 
notice and report shall contain a description of the actions taken by CFIUS with respect to the 
transaction, and the factors that were determinative in the transaction analysis.
139
  Furthermore, 
                                                        
134 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2005). 
135 31 C.F.R. § 800.223 (2005). The regulations expressly indicate that this rule applies to all types of investors 
equally, rather than assuming that certain types of institutions are passive investors. Id. 
136 31 C.F.R. § 800.403(c) (2005). 
137 31 C.F.R. § 800.104 (2005) (providing an example of a transaction that the CFIUS would consider a device to 
avoid FINSA). 
138 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(3)(A)-(B). 
139 Id. at § 2170(b)(3)(C). 
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each certified notice and report shall state that there are no unresolved national security concerns 
with the reported transaction.
140
 
  This certification requirement allows Congress to access to confidential information that 
was not otherwise available to it under the Exon-Florio structure. However, the main concern 
about this information-sharing is that FINSA does not prevent Congress from releasing the 
contents of the reports to the public.
141
 For example, FINSA allows the Majority and Minority 
Leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the House Committee on 
Financial Services, as well as the staff of any authorized Congressmen to gain access to CFIUS 
information.
142
 State senators may even access confidential information about transactions 




III. ANALYSIS  
The CFIUS process under Exon-Florio allowed for great political pressure and 
considerations other than national security to play a role in foreign investment transactions in the 
U.S. FINSA‟s broad national security concept and lack of clear guidance‟s as to how the U.S. 
government will access national security risks will likely perpetuate the same problems of 
political pressure, persecution of unpopular investors, and protectionism concerns that occurred 
under the previous regulations. Under this regulatory scheme, foreign investors carry the risk of 
having their transaction blocked under the proxy of national security when such threat may not 
                                                        
140 Id. at § 2170(b)(3)(C)(ii). 
141 See Stagg, supra note 12, at 353 (discussing the negative effects of the CFIUS‟s release of information to 
Congress without any guarantee that FINSA‟s confidentiality provision will be respected). 
142 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (g)(1) (requiring the CFIUS to provide briefings on a covered transaction upon request 
of any Member of Congress, which may also be provided to the congressional staff of the requesting Congressman 
having appropriate security clearance). See also id. at § 2170(b)(3)(C)(iii). 
143 Id. at § 2170(b)(3)(C)(iii)(V). 
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actually be present. While the nation‟s security is a concern of the highest order, past cases 
reveal that even in the absence of national security risks, Congress has used political pressure to 
delay and prevent unpopular foreign investors‟ deals to further protectionist concerns. This result 
erodes the U.S. free foreign investment policy and principals of laissez-faire economics, and has 
the potential to stifle U.S. economic growth by driving away efficient investment.  
 
 
A. FINSA’s Lack of Analytical Guidance for National Security Risks has the  
Potential to Turn FINSA into an Instrument for Protectionism 
 
Fear of foreign control of U.S. industries has politicized the CFIUS review process under 
Exon-Florio, and FINSA perpetuates this model. The CFIUS‟s unchecked interpretation of 
national security concerns permit the U.S. government to use FINSA as a tool to perpetuate 
protectionism and threaten efficient economic investment that has made the United States a 
global economic leader. 
First, FINSA‟s broad national security concept fails to provide analytical guidance to 
distinguish between serious and implausible national security threats. The terms “critical,” as 
applied to technology and infrastructure, is introduced without qualification, leaving the potential 
for protectionist abuse.
144
 For example, FINSA fails to provide guidance regarding when the 
CFIUS should consider the fact that the existence of a multiplicity of alternative supplies to the 
critical infrastructure would render any attempt to delay, deny, or place conditions on supply 
access entirely non-credible. This lack of Congressional guidance to the CFIUS is problematic 
because it permits the government to assume that every “critical” sector of the U.S. industry 
                                                        
144 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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That same problem related to critical infrastructure also exists in regards to military 
goods. For instance, FINSA and the CFIUS regulations fail to consider whether alternative 
sources for the sale of military goods are easily available.
146
 Instead, the CFIUS identifies that a 
defense related or critical infrastructure industry will be under foreign control, and that fact alone 
becomes determinative to the deal.
147
 For example, in the CNOOC-Unocal deal, political 
pressure resulted in CNOOC‟s withdrawal prior to the conclusion of the CFIUS analysis.
148
 
However, nothing indicated that either CFIUS or Congress considered the fact that twenty one 
countries, (including fifteen non-OPEC countries) had oil for export greater than Unocal‟s entire 
U.S. production, and that six more could supplement a large portion of Unocal‟s U.S. output.
149
  
The conclusion that CNOOC‟s acquisition of Unocal would have affected the U.S. 
national energy interests was far out from reality. Congressional and the public opinion reaction, 
driven by protectionist sentiments, failed to consider the true economic reality behind the 
proposed transaction.
150
 The U.S. government used national security as a proxy to drive away an 
unpopular investor. Under FINSA‟s broad national security and critical infrastructure umbrella, 
the government has set a dangerous precedent that permits it to terminate future deals similarly 
to the CNOOC-Unocal case. The risk remains high that Congress and other governmental 
agencies will use FINSA as a protectionist tool given that CFIUS‟s analysis does not take into 
                                                        
145 See supra notes 6 at 53-54, 124 and accompanying text. 
146 See Graham & Krugman, supra note 6 at 53-54; see supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
147 See Travalini, supra note 14; see Bowman, supra note 84. 
148 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (suggesting that no real national security threat was present in the 
CNOOC-Unocal deal). 
149 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (analyzing the transaction and suggesting that extra imports of oil to 
make up for Unocal production would not have a significant economic impact). 
150 See supra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the definition of national security changes with the popular perception of threats, 
which allows the political pressures inherent in the Exon Florio/FINSA investigations to prevent 
CFIUS from accurately balancing security concerns. That was the case when the public and 
Congressional unease about high oil prices terminated a relatively innocuous Chinese acquisition 
of a U.S. oil company.
152
 Protectionist practices are even more evident after the 9/11 attacks 
when the public opinion‟s perception of foreign threat and Congressional discomfort with 
globalization ran high like in the DPW deal.
153
  
Although the CFIUS announced its approval of the DPW deal, Congress exercised 
political pressure to the extent that DPW could not feasibly move forward with the recently 
acquired port management business. As has been the case since the “fears of the Japanese 
dominance” in the 1950‟s up to the more recent DPW case, Congress and the public opinion 
have taken advantage of the unclear standards of FINSA (then Exon-Florio) to create xenophobic 
political pressure on foreign investment strategies and acquisitions. Fairchild, Thomson-LTV, 
CNOOC –Unocal, and the DPW deal all represent situations when political pressure and bad 
publicity resulted in voluntary withdrawal from a transaction.
154
  These transactions demonstrate 
that unclear statutory terms permit the public opinion to define the term as a means of opposing 
any perceived foreign threat that may not have anything to do with national security.  
                                                        
151 See supra notes 90,93 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra text accompanying note 91 (describing the political pressure over the CNOOC-Unocal proposed deal 
and the reasons beyond national security that caused the termination of the deal). 
153 See supra text accompanying notes 103-06 (noting the post 9/11-fear surrounding the DPW deal and the U.S. 
policy of strengthening foreign investment controls). 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28, 72, 98; See also note 93 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, FINSA has unjustly expanded the “national security” concept with the 
unqualified inclusion of “homeland security.” The homeland security term is so broad that it has 
the potential to turn unrelated issues that impose little or no threat to national security into 
national security threats. The risk is that the “homeland security” concept will provide those 
opposing an open foreign investment policy an additional argument to define national security as 
related to whatever foreign threat is currently in vogue, in a manner does not really involve 
national security and instead thwart beneficial foreign investment. 
 According to the CFIUS‟ 2008 Annual Report to Congress, in the years 2005 to 2007, 
companies filed 313 notices of transactions.  Roughly eight percent of such notices were 
withdrawn during the review stage, five percent resulted in an investigation (45 day review 
process), and less than one percent resulted in a Presidential decision.
155
 If the U.S. government 
can deem the transactions that resulted in presidential action (less than one percent of the total 
transactions in a two year period) as legitimate national security threats, then CFIUS must be 
reviewing too many transactions that are otherwise outside of its scope of authority. The result is 
that the lack of clear guidance regarding the CFIUS review of national security-related 
transactions creates additional administrative burdens on the government as well.  
 Additionally, the CFIUS 2008 report showed that there was no credible evidence of a 
widespread coordinated strategy among foreign governments or corporations to acquire critical 
U.S. technologies through the use of foreign direct investment.
156
 If the CFIUS itself has 
observed, analyzed, and found that foreign investment has not been used as a national security 
threat in the vast majority of transactions that were reviewed between 2006-2008, the 
                                                        
155 See CFIUS 2008 report, supra note 66, at 3. 
156 See id. 
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government should create filters that allow it to focus in transactions that really relate to national 
security. 
 Although a broad national security concept provides the President the necessary flexibility 
to deal with real threats not readily fit in any specific category listed in FINSA, the lack of more 
specific guidance leaves the government without appropriate filters to discern truly troublesome 
cases from nonthreatening ones. The result is an unnecessary burden or inefficiency on foreign 
investors, the U.S. government, and the U.S. economy. 
 
 
B. FINSA’s expanded Congressional Oversight Has The Potential To Unduly Politicize 
Foreign Investment 
 
FINSA has significantly increased Congress‟ ability to politicize foreign investment 
transactions, even when no real national-security threat exists. It allows members of Congress 
(including their staff) to access confidential information regarding CFIUS transactions, which 
will likely result in more congressional pressure over certain unpopular transactions.
157
  
By allowing so many members of Congress (including their staff) to view CFIUS‟s 
confidential information, FINSA significantly increases the probability that politicians will 
thwart foreign investment deals through political rhetoric, instead of via objective analyses.
158
 
Another problematic point is that FINSA fails to clarify who decides which information should 
remain classified. It is important to note that most of the information being disclosed to Congress 
                                                        
157 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
158 See Stagg, supra note 12, at 353. 
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under FINSA is corporate confidential information. The main concern about this information 
sharing is that contents of the reports might leak to the public.
159
 
In weighing the risks of investing in the United States, foreign investors consider the 
consequences of compromising sensitive proprietary information through the CFIUS review 
process. Companies are generally unwilling to risk the disclosure of strategic competitive 
information during the CFIUS review process if they believe such disclosure could lead to 
compromising business objectives and proprietary information.
160
 This will likely disincentive 
foreign investors and heighten the political nature of foreign investment in the United States 
when no risk of national security is at stake. The history of transactions that have been cancelled 
as a result of political pressure and negative publicity is long.
161
 Even before FINSA, Congress 
has intervened effectively (although indirectly) to prevent many transactions from being 
concluded.
162
 That was the case with the Fujitsu-Fairchild proposed deal, CNOOC-Unocal, 
Thomson-LTV and DPW. In each instance, Congress exercised political pressure by threatening 
to pass legislation specifically banning the transaction.
163
 Even when CFIUS approval looked 
certain, the parties would abandon the transaction at the prospect of a battle with Congress. This 
is illustrated in the DPW case, where despite the CFIUS‟s announcement of approval, DPW 
could not feasibly fight Congress. Congressional pressure alone has been a highly effective tool, 
if not the most effective one, in preventing undesired deals.
164
 Under FINSA, Congress has 
statutory authority to access confidential information relating to CFIUS transactions. The risk is 
                                                        
159 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the negative effects of CFIUS‟s release of 
information to Congress without any guarantee that FINSA‟s confidentiality provision will be respected). 
160 See Stagg, supra note 12, at 357. 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 30, 64-65, 100-106. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93, 102-04. 
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high that this information sharing will give Congress even more leverage to intervene in foreign 
investment transactions. 
FINSA should not allow the CFIUS to provide Congress with detailed reports of specific 
transactions. It is important that Congress be informed about foreign investment transactions and 
their effect upon the nation‟s economy and national security. However, FINSA already requires 
detailed annual reports to Congress, which are appropriate for such an assessment. For example, 
the CFIUS 2008 report to Congress contains specific findings about potential espionage activities 
and foreign intelligence threats.
165
 By providing the additional briefing and disclosure 
requirements (beyond what is provided in the annual reports) FINSA exaggerates transparency to 
the detriment of foreign investors. 
Additionally, when foreign investors disclose corporate confidential information to 
CFIUS they rely on FINSA‟s confidentiality provision and the guarantee of privacy.
166
 Without 
assurances that corporate sensitive data will be protected, investors might withdraw given the 
fear that U.S. competitors or lobbying groups related to specific industry sectors might acquire 
access to such information. Domestic competitors could seek to win a bidding war with a foreign 
investor by exerting influence on the CFIUS process through lobbying Congress as exemplified 
in the Thomson-LTV case, when Thomson‟s American competitor, Martin Marietta, used 
national security as a proxy to argue against Thomson‟s bid to acquire LTV.
167
 In that case, 
Congressional pressure was so intense that Thomson gave up the bid, and Martin Marietta 
                                                        
165 See supra text accompanying note 82; 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(b)(3)(A)-(C); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(m)(1)-(2); 
see supra text accompanying note 116.  
166 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c)(2006) and accompanying text (explaining FINSA‟s confidentiality provision). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
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 Similarly to the Thomson-Marietta situation, there is also the 
possibly that special interest groups will likely gain influence in the CFIUS process as a result of 
information disclosed to congress. Thus, the potential for political abuse is high.  
The U.S. has been a leading example of free market ideas, as well as of policies favoring 
foreign investment. However, FINSA‟s allowance of such a close congressional oversight over 
CFIUS transactions can negatively impact the free market. Congress has acted in xenophobic 
ways as illustrated in the DPW transaction.
169
 The risk remains that emotionally-charged 
messages and arguments aimed at guaranteeing votes during upcoming elections will disrupt the 
freedom in private transactions and foreign investment despite the lack of actual national security 
risks.  
Finally, the continual perceived use of CFIUS as a tool of economic protectionism could 
lead to retaliation in the form of restrictions of American foreign investment by other countries. 
Perception that CFIUS investigations are based upon political enmity could deter international 
cooperation with American foreign policy goals at a time when such cooperation is essential to 
global stability and cooperation. 
C. FINSA’s Broad Coverage Has the Potential to Burden Foreign Investors and Negatively 
Impact Foreign Investment  
 
Foreign investment in the United States has the potential to benefit the domestic 
economy,
170
 even though“national security concerns over the increased opportunities for 
espionage and technology disruptions are paramount.”
171
 Although national security justifies 
                                                        
168 Id. 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 95, 102-106. 
170 See supra notes 1, 3-4 and accompanying text. 
171 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 795 (discussing FINSA‟s potential effects on foreign investment transactions). 
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governmental monitoring and intervention in cross-border deals taking place in the U.S, 
FINSA‟s broad coverage will likely have a negative impact in foreign investment. 
From the foreign investors‟ perspective, FINSA‟s new CFIUS review process has several 
implications. First, it adds time and risk to the investment due to the CFIUS reviews. Second, it 
increases the costs and burdens to involved parties related to the transaction. Third, it adds the 
risk that the investor might have to make concessions and enter into mitigation agreements, in 
which the government holds more leverage and significantly more bargaining power than the 
foreign investor. Fourth, it adds the potential risk that competing domestic bidders may use the 
CFIUS review process to manipulate the system and make unsolicited or hostile bids.
172
 The 
additional time, risk and cost implications will likely serve as a deterrent to some potential 
investors who might not welcome the intense scrutiny and lengthy process necessary for the 
transaction to proceed. Additionally, the investor must therefore consider additional costs 
regarding attorney‟s fees, CFIUS filing fees, production of documents, data, among other 
logistical costs associated with approval. These costs exist even when the transaction poses no 
national security threat because the CFIUS review is mandatory. Even when investors properly 
determine that the transaction will not impose national security threats, such an assessment has to 
come from CFIUS itself.
173
 Although the CFIUS filing is voluntary, it is also the only way to 
avoid risks of divestiture. 
Similarly, the risks associated with potential concessions or mitigation agreements are 
likely to be a deterrent. Concessions have generally included divesting from subsidiaries with 
sensitive technology, and entering into agreements concerning network security, government 
                                                        
172 See id. 
173 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
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access to critical infrastructure, and voting arrangements.
174
 Some foreign investors might be 
willing to enter into mitigation agreements when the agreement does not significantly affect the 
business‟ management. However, it seems obvious that in many instances the investor will have 
to make a difficult and potentially costly decision regardless of the situation. This is aggravated 
by the fact that the government holds a significantly stronger bargaining position than any 
foreign investor, and is mostly free to impose “take it or leave it” deals. Mitigation agreements 
are appropriate when real national security threats are involved, but they should not be used as a 
means to disincentive “undesired” transactions or to interfere in the free market. 
Competing bidders for domestic acquisitions may use the CFIUS process to their 
advantage by manipulating the system thereby making unsolicited hostile bids as exemplified in 
the Thomson-LTV and CNOOC-Unocal deals. In the latter case, the American Chevron 
Corporation acquired Unocal despite the lack of a real national security threat in Unocal‟s 
proposed acquisition by CNOOC.
175
 This is merely another factor, or potential barrier, that a 
foreign investor must consider when investing in the U.S, especially when it is in a sensitive 
industry such as critical infrastructure.   
In additional to the implications on foreign investors, multiple implications threaten 
domestic companies. The U.S. economy welcomes foreign investment because it depends on it 
for economic stability.
176
 In a globalized and integrated world, economic isolationism can be 
disastrous. Given its relatively low savings rate and the global economic crisis, the U.S. depends 
heavily on foreign capital inflows to help promote growth and to fund the federal budget 
                                                        
174 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
175 See supra text accompanying note 87. 
176 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (noting that as of 2006 foreign investors employed more than 5 
million Americans, and were responsible for close to 20% of U.S. manufacturing GDP). 
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 This is also true at the microeconomic level, where many U.S-based businesses depend 
on doing business abroad. Innumerous U.S. business depend on foreign markets to buy their 
products and services, as well as to sell to the U.S. companies raw materials, manufactured 
goods, commodities, etc.
178
 Due to this dependence, it is in the best interests of U.S. national 
security that other countries provide an efficient and safe investment environment for U.S. 
businesses. U.S. businesses could possibly suffer a negative effect when other countries enact 
laws similar to FINSA in an effort to retaliate against U.S. isolationism. For example, “Canada, 
China and Thailand have all passed legislation creating new rules for foreign investment, 
including new screening requirements and reporting regimes.”
179
 
 Despite the undisputed need for foreign investment regulation and national security 
protection, FINSA‟s current structure is unbalanced. The broad and undefined national security 
concept has created additional burdens on foreign investors even when no real national security 
threat exists. This structure is likely to disrupt the U.S. free foreign investment policy, the 
country‟s domestic economy, and U.S. investment in other markets. 
 
D. Congress Can Improve FINSA by Providing Clear Guidance to Real National Security 
Risks, Limiting Congressional Involvement, and Providing a “Fast Track” Analysis for 
Passive Investment 
 
                                                        
177 See generally WAINE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CHINA‟S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (Congressional Research Service 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf 
(arguing that “given its relatively low savings rate, the U.S. economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows 
from countries with high savings rates (such as China) to help promote growth and to fund the federal budget 
deficit.” Morrison & Labonte point out that from June 2002 to June 2008, China‟s holdings of U.S. securities 
increased by over $1 trillion. Of the public debt that is privately held, foreigners hold roughly more than half. They 
also note that the current global financial crisis has raised considerable concern in the U.S. over the willingness of 
foreigners, including China, to continue to invest in U.S. securities). 
178 See Foreign Trade Statistics, supra note 3. 
179 See Travalini, supra note 14, at 797. 
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Congress can improve FINSA‟s regulatory scheme by limiting direct congressional 
involvement and providing clear analytical guidance to national security risks. FINSA‟s current 
structure allows Congress to unduly politicize foreign investment and erode the free foreign 
investment policy.
180
 Under the U.S. Constitutional system of checks and balances it is important 
that Congress has some information relating to foreign investment, but Congress should not have 
unbridled access to specific business information and corporate data. The CFIUS annual reports 
to Congress suffice for this purpose and contain significant findings and aggregate information 
that preserves confidential information.
181
  
Congress should amend FINSA and direct the CFIUS to issue more specific guidelines 
discerning truly troublesome national security risks from nonthreatening ones. Defining national 
security is not necessarily the solution, since this is a complex term and involves several 
considerations. But limiting FINSA‟s broad and ambiguous national security concept is 
necessary.
182
 The best option is to require the CFIUS to establish and consider factors that would 
render a more through analysis of the alleged national security risk to avoid repeats of the Unocal 
deal.
183
 For example, CFIUS should take into consideration whether a multiplicity of alternative 
supplies to the domestic critical infrastructure would mitigate or terminate risks of supply 
shortage. This consideration should take into account national and international alternative 
sources. If the domestic “critical infrastructure” company supplies a practically insignificant 
amount of the national demand, this should indicate that the acquisition of such company by a 
foreign entity creates no national security threat. Implementation of such a standard would have 
                                                        
180 See supra Part III.A-B. 
181 See supra text accompanying note 82 (stating that FINSA requires CFIUS to state in its annual report to Congress 
whether there is credible evidence of a foreign coordinated strategy to acquire U.S. critical technology companies, 
and whether there is industrial espionage). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 124, 127 (explaining the breadth of FINSA‟s national security factors). 
183 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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permitted the parties to conclude the Unocal deal and perhaps many other similar non-
threatening ones.
184
   
CFIUS should also analyze the additional costs involved with alternative supply sources. 
If the costs of obtaining the same good or commodity abroad are relatively similar, and the 
alternative source is in a U.S. trade partner, this should indicate (at least in most situations) that 
no real risk of domestic shortage exists.
185
 In today‟s global market it is not unreasonable to 
acquire critical infrastructure goods or commodities abroad.
186
 In many situations this method 
might be more economically efficient than developing and keeping local industries that cannot 
compete with foreign companies that make a better product. Congress should also require that 
CFIUS disclose which factors it considered assessing transactions with national security 
implications. Congress should require the CFIUS to provide this information in an aggregate 
basis, so as to protect the confidentiality of foreign investors‟ information. This method would 
enhance transparency in the review process and would save the government and foreign 
investors time and investment resources.  
Finally, Congress should amend FINSA to provide a simplified and faster (“fast-track”) 
analysis for passive investment situations, since they generally do not involve foreign control of 
U.S. business.
187
 This would significantly decrease the time and costs involved in the CFIUS 
review process (for the investor and the government), and would likely incentive passive 
investors to report each transaction. In addition, a “fast-track” analysis for passive investment 
                                                        
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See Foreign Trade Statistics, supra note 3. 
187 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (explaining passive investment situations, as well as other 
investment situations that might not involve control, but must be submitted to the CFIUS review for clearance). 
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situations would allow the CFIUS to focus on transactions that could actually affect national 
security without spending time and resources on non-threatening and beneficial deals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Protecting national security when actual threats exist is undisputedly necessary. The 
question of how far the concept of national security should go to the detriment of a free foreign 
investment policy is a more difficult issue to assess. When balancing the competing interests of 
national security and foreign investment policy, Congress should be mindful of the impacts of 
excessive regulation. When President Ford created the CFIUS over thirty years ago to monitor 
foreign investment in the U.S, the world socio-economical context was very different. As foreign 
investment intensified over the years, so did Congressional concern of foreign ownership of U.S. 
assets. 
Congress has significantly amended the CFIUS process to increase the scrutiny of 
review. Not surprisingly, the latest amendment (FINSA) came after the 9/11 attacks as an 
immediate response to a UAE government-owned company‟s attempt to acquire U.S-based ports 
management. FINSA‟s broad sweeping concept of national security, and expanded congressional 
oversight provisions has the potential to perpetuate the historical political interference with 
foreign investment, and disrupt the U.S. free foreign investment policy. Many pre-FINSA 
transactions illustrate these concerns, when protectionist and political considerations interfered 
with, and ultimately prevented the conclusion of such transactions. Congress should amend 
FINSA to provide clearer analytical guidance to real national security risks (including analysis of 
the availability and cost of alternative supply sources), and allow non-threatening transactions to 
go on without additional burdens and delays. A simplified “fast-track” review process for passive 
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investment would also benefit many foreign investors and decrease FINSA‟s impact in these 
types of investment.  
Foreign investment is a vital source of job creation, development and employment of 
more than 5 million Americans. In a globalized economy where countries are interdependent, 
FINSA‟s lenient structure towards protectionist actions has the potential to negatively impact the 
free market. Considering that many sectors of the U.S. economy depend on foreign investment, 
FINSA‟s ambiguity about national security could be detrimental to the national economy. In the 
current state of global economic interdependence it is within the United States‟ best national 
security interests to keep a favorable policy towards foreign investment. 
